In the EU’s policy towards the South Caucasus, it’s not only important how Brussels supports Yerevan, but also how these signals are perceived in Baku. After years of conflict, border disputes, and complex negotiations, any move favoring one side automatically impacts the regional balance. Therefore, the opening of the European market for Armenian goods amid Russian pressure cannot be viewed as a purely economic decision. For Azerbaijan, it might appear as another manifestation of political favoritism towards Armenia. And for Ukraine, it serves as a reminder: the principle of territorial integrity and equal standards should not depend on whom Brussels deems a more convenient partner at any given moment.
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This is discussed in Channel 5’s article.
On May 20, on the eve of parliamentary elections in Armenia, the Russian Federation began imposing restrictions on the import of a range of goods from this country, including vegetables, herbs, fruits, as well as fish and flowers. Moscow explained these measures as sanitary violations, but in reality, they appear to be a tool of economic pressure against the backdrop of Yerevan’s deepening rapprochement with the EU.
In turn, Ursula von der Leyen promised to provide immediate financial assistance to Armenia amounting to over 50 million euros. The EU is prepared to grant Yerevan new trade preferences. At the same time, the European Union is withdrawing similar benefits from Ukraine – a country that has been resisting Moscow’s military aggression since 2022 at the cost of immense sacrifices. The duty-free access regime for Ukrainian goods to the EU market ceased to be effective on June 5, 2025. The very next day, the EU reinstated duties and quotas on a range of Ukrainian agricultural products.
Von der Leyen’s promise to Pashinyan regarding duty-free access to the EU market goes beyond the usual logic of decision-making within the European Union. Such measures cannot be taken during a phone conversation and do not fall within the personal competence of the European Commission President. Changes to customs regimes, granting new tariff preferences, or duty-free access require mandatory legal formalization through the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. This follows directly from the rules for forming the EU’s trade policy, as outlined on the official European Commission website.
In the case of Armenia, this is a crucial nuance, as it was excluded from the EU’s system of trade preferences (GSP/GSP+) on January 1, 2022, for no longer meeting the criteria of a beneficiary country.
Von der Leyen’s policy towards the South Caucasus increasingly appears not as a balanced EU approach, but as a politically biased and pro-Armenian stance. For instance, between 2020-2023, Azerbaijan ended the 30-year Armenian occupation of Karabakh and adjacent regions. In doing so, Baku reasserted sovereignty over its internationally recognized territories in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 822, 853, 874, and 884, which demanded the withdrawal of Armenian forces from there.
The South Caucasus requires not gestures that heighten a sense of asymmetry, but a policy capable of maintaining a balance between law, security, and the responsibility of the parties. If the EU supports Armenia in response to Russian pressure, it must do so in a way that does not create an impression of selective favoritism and does not undermine the trust of other partners in the region. For Ukraine, this is not a secondary issue: where international law begins to be applied based on political sympathy, the very foundation upon which Ukraine’s position rests weakens.
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